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Measuring radical innovation project
success: typical metrics don’t work
Jimmi Normann Kristiansen and Paavo Ritala
A
n important part of large firms’ radical innovation competency is tied to an
appropriate managerial mind-set and a system that facilitates experimentation.
Accordingly, organizational setup, culture, processes, launch strategies and top
management involvement have a major effect on the success of radical innovation. From a
management viewpoint, radical innovation projects are characterized by higher uncertainty
and absorption of new knowledge for the firm, as well as exploration of new markets,
technologies and/or business models. Therefore, suitable managerial practices to support
these projects vary substantially from those supporting incremental innovation projects.
Throughout the radical innovation project life cycle of Discovery (exploration), Incubation
(experimentation) and Acceleration (development) (O‘Connor et al., 2008), suitable key
performance indicators (KPIs) (metrics) must be applied. During the Acceleration phase,
radical innovation projects are matured to a point, where they should be measured in line
with established metrics for incremental innovation within firms. However, in the innovation
front-end (Discovery and Incubation), both the process and expected output have a much
lower degree of predictability than in incremental innovation projects. Because radical
innovation projects have distinct features differing from incremental innovation projects,
commonly used metrics such as time to market and net present value provide little use and
may even be harmful for project progress.
Illustrating the above, O‘Connor et al. (2008) discuss IBM’s project for silicon-germanium
alloy for integrated circuits (from the 1990s). Here, the radical innovation project led by
Bernie Meyerson had to be bootlegged and protected from the rest of the R&D organization
to survive. The initial business model was misaligned, and subsequent sales growth and
market expectations showed lower than expected fiscal returns. This nearly killed the
project. A modification of evaluation metrics had to be made to represent the nature of the
project. Silicon-germanium, a highly efficient semiconductor alloy, is still among the best-
performing technology platforms for computer chips today. It currently competes with, and
possibly outperforms, Intel and their pure silicon-based chips in the computer-chip
efficiency race (Armasu, 2015).
Radical innovation projects are uncertain, long-term investments that often target new
business areas for the distant future (5þ years). Therefore, metrics should be adjusted to
meet demands and criteria of success suitable for this type of project, as commonly used
metrics fit poorly if firms are to move beyond an incremental innovation strategy
(Christensen et al., 2008).
Previous research has emphasized the importance of using suitable metrics for incremental
and radical innovation (Henttonen et al., 2016; Joh and Mayfield, 2009; Paulson et al., 2007;
Griffin and Page, 1996). There is, however, a need for a clearer understanding of the
damaging effects incurred by using “traditional” product development metrics in the early
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life cycle of radical innovation projects. Moreover, a further discussion of suitable metrics for
the early stages of radical innovation projects’ life cycle is called for. In this paper,
frequently used metrics in innovation management are examined and discussed in terms of
their usability with respect to the contrast between incremental and radical innovation
projects. This is followed by a presentation of challenges with innovation project
measurement in three industry-leading global firms. This leads to a discussion of suitable
metrics for radical innovation activities.
1. Frequently used metrics for innovation projects
The term “key performance indicator” has been widely used in the management literature
and refers to identifying key activities of a value-creation process in the firm and generating
a way of measuring those activities (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). For the innovation
management literature, key performance indicators have been researched mostly in relation
with non-radical innovation projects. The popular measures used to gauge success are
either firm- or product-related, which often target markets (e.g. market size and time to
market) and finances (net present value or similar) and whether the pre-established plan is
followed (Blindenbach-Driessen et al., 2010; Henttonen et al., 2016).
These measures very rarely target specifically radical innovation projects. One implication is
that evaluations will be largely focused on fiscal output and expected market performance,
rather than the process itself. Frequently used metrics for innovation projects, their applicability
and their implications for radical innovation projects are given in Table I.
Table I Commonly used metrics for innovation projects
Key
performance




difference between future cash
inflows and outflows and discounts
it to the value represented today
Uncertain and fluctuating net present value
as future revenue is arduous to predict with
accuracy (especially in early stages)
Return on
investment
Gives (post-launch) feedback on
the net income from launched
projects. Compares gains versus
costs of investments
Investments in radical innovation are
broader than “single projects”. Return on
investment does not provide a valuation of
new competency and spillover effects built




than n years old
Provides information on how new
projects contribute to the firm’s
turnover and the firm’s competitive
position
Analyses will often show that most profit
comes collectively from incremental
innovation projects, except for periods with




Explains how firms are able to
secure patent rights, giving an idea
of future licensing potential, etc.
Time required to patent is often longer for
radical innovation projects. It may also be
an unfamiliar patent landscape. A lot of
experimentation is involved before product/
technology descriptions are made
Time-to-market Describes the speed from
innovation project investment to the
first customer
Expected conceptualization and
experimentation for 2þ years before
commercialization path is laid. Often a 5þ
year time horizon to market
Success/failure
rate of projects
Measures the degree to which new
projects in the portfolio succeed/fail.
Indicates our ability to select “the
right” projects for the pipeline
“Failure” rates will be higher for radical
innovation projects. These projects target
multiple applications, and an initial project
“failure” may not portray overall success
and new competency development
Sources: Kirsner (2015); Bremser and Barsky (2004); Griffin and Page (1996, 1993) and own
adaptation
































The metrics mentioned in Table I, covering both pre- and post-launch, either will constitute a
poor fit if used or simply will not be applicable because of the different time horizons in project
life cycle periods in incremental innovation projects compared to radical innovation projects.
For radical innovation projects, the technological route or market feasibility assessment may
deviate from the preexisting assumptions, and new opportunities may occur during the
course of five or more years of development. A key challenge in measuring progress in
radical innovation projects is, therefore, firms’ inability to follow pre-set goals and measure
project performance according to these goals during the project period. Challenges may
also arise post-market launch, as new market learning may be needed for successful
adoption and impact (Feiereisen et al., 2013).
To further investigate the challenge of finding appropriate metrics for radical innovation, the
authors conducted case studies in three large, international firms that are global leaders in their
respective fields. All three firms employ more than 5,000 people and have an annual turnover
exceeding US$2bn. The firms spend between 6 and 13 per cent annually on R&D, and all of
them have a proven track record in incremental innovation (two of the firms spend three times
the industry average on R&D, and the third firm is on par with the industry). Pseudonyms of
GreenCO, HeavyCO and MasterCO are used. A total of 13 in-depth semi-structured interviews
with managers and directors of innovation were conducted at the firms. All interviews were
recorded, transcribed and coded. This was further supplemented with documentation from
project tools, strategy workshops, seminar work and publicly available information.
2. Understanding the measurement challenge: case evidence from three large
firms
As radical innovation projects have different characteristics from incremental innovation
projects, and frequently used metrics, such as net present value, introduced challenges
once applied in a radical innovation context. According to their innovation director,
HeavyCO was experiencing signs of low performance when using their established metrics:
It is flagged as a low net present value project. Senior management can deliberately say, this is a
strategic project. But at every point, they will be told, this has no money, this has no money.
Even though firms are following the suggested management practices of radical innovation,
metrics stemming from incremental innovation activities provided substantial challenges for
HeavyCO. Another example was given from MasterCO:
What really will resonate in 90 per cent of the rest of the organization is: “How much have you
sold? What is the bottom line?” “Yes, but we have a strong portfolio. . .”, or, “Sure, but how much
have you sold?” And that is the name of the game.
Applying commonly used metrics for radical innovation projects has created challenges in
the case firms especially because the initial focus of radical innovation project management
is to conceptualize and experiment and, through this, gradually reduce the uncertainty
affiliated with the project. Both the expected financial outcomes and projected time-to-
“Radical innovation projects are characterized by higher
uncertainty and absorption of new knowledge for the firm,
as well as exploration of new markets, technologies and/or
business models.”
































market provide challenges for radical innovation project activities when compared to
incremental innovation activities. The time-horizon also created issues in GreenCO, as the
cycles of how often projects were measured using the commonly used evaluation criteria
were too short:
If I have to choose a radical or an incremental project, it depends on what you gain and what you
lose. But the difficulty is, we do these annual evaluations based on results. And if you do
something really well, it may take a longer time to see that.
To resolve measurement challenges, the MasterCO respondent argued that they would
prefer to use forward-looking rather than backward-looking metrics. MasterCO consolidated
the information on what the organization had learned throughout their work with radical
innovation. This enabled project managers to improve legitimacy toward sponsors in senior
management. A concluding remark from a manager in MasterCO was related to the need
for metrics for radical innovation projects:
In the beginning, we said, “Well, we shouldn’t have key performance indicators; we shouldn’t be
measured. We cannot create a budget because there is too much uncertainty”. And I think that is
nonsense. I think that it is an entirely different perspective than if you look into a factory making
10 million units per year with some well-defined variants. In reality, we need just as much
structure to be able to attract resources. We have to find other ways of getting structure out of
chaos to be able to communicate with our surroundings.
The illustrative examples above are a part of a larger case study with these three firms. As it
is arduous to use commonly used metrics for radical innovation projects, there is a crucial
exercise in developing replacement metrics for these projects.
3. Metrics for radical innovation projects
Based on a review of the literature and case study insights, we suggest three applicable
sets of KPIs for assessing radical innovation project performance.
3.1 Market orientation
A commonly discussed feature of radical innovation is technological novelty. Certainly, the
technological progression radical innovations can introduce may have a breakthrough
nature. However, many technologically novel products fail the actual market test, and firms
should therefore pay attention to how they are oriented toward the market for their radical
innovation activities (Table II).
3.2 Learning and future opportunities
Radical innovation projects are often a part of a larger platform investment in firms. Here,
firms have the possibility to cross-fertilize learning and investments across opportunities
and business segments. Firms should therefore encourage opportunities that ensure
positive conditions for new opportunities to emerge and even to foster growth in existing
business segments.
“Many technologically novel products fail the actual market
test, and firms should therefore pay attention to how they
are oriented toward the market for their radical innovation
activities.”
































Another aspect will be to go/terminate decisions. In case of project termination, firms should
make high-quality termination reports to de-brief key learning from the process.
Finally, firms should also be able to assess how they use and grow core competencies,
including the increase in the relevant knowledge base of the firm. Examples of firms that
have been actively working with innovation as a holistic innovation system to boost the
knowledge base are 3M[3], General Electric and Coca-Cola (Alsever, 2015) (Table III).
3.3 Resource dedication
Radical innovation activities may need to compete for resources from the firm, and it
is therefore crucial to have a project overview with a description of resources required
to support projects. HeavyCO had been focusing on keeping the proportion of
financial resources allocated to their radical innovation projects low. However, these
projects involved substantial intangible resources in the form of highly skilled, cross-
functional teams. In addition, these employees had contact with the existing resource
base of the firm, enabling them to efficiently and quickly gain access to key
stakeholders of the firm.
When radical innovation projects mature in the pipeline, they will eventually require an
increased allocation of financial resources to get to market. Firms should ex ante
decide whether the resources will be available when they are needed. For areas of
higher uncertainty, resources can be shared among firms. This includes sharing of the
knowledge base but could also represent a pool of test equipment. For example,
GreenCO had been sharing resources with external partners on test equipment for a
project for a substantial period. Access to these external resources enabled GreenCO






1-5 Likert scale, text
description
The potential of the market should be described in terms
of attractiveness, growth and, if possible, the size.
Latent markets are more difficult to assess, as these are






Does the firm have contacts that help in gaining access
to markets? Has the firm previously navigated in markets
similar to the one pursued? Are there complementary
players in the firm’s ecosystem who can be helpful?
Gives an understanding of the market uncertainty
related to the project, and whether this uncertainty can
be embraced through networking
Finding new
market needs
Text and 1-5 Likert scale :
degree of novelty, existing
needs or future needs
Are needs already saturated by other products or
services? Are we targeting existing or latent needs? The
firm has to understand the implications of either entering
a market with a substituting solution, or whether new
market needs can be created and tapped. Can also





1-5 Likert scale, text
description
Is it something that can be clearly attributed as
delivering a significant value to the customer? The
uncertainty related to radical innovation projects is
significant; the potential benefits that the customer
should receive should be at least equally significant
Source: Based on literature review and the case studies in this paper
































to vastly accelerate planned pilot tests, not to mention saving the firm millions of
dollars, as they did not have to build a pilot plant (Table IV).
4. Conclusion: measuring value creation rather than value created
Established companies across industries have developed comprehensive toolsets for
managing innovation projects and portfolios. Most of these tools and approaches are well
suited for incremental innovation, but not for radical innovation. Highly uncertain radical
innovation projects demand toolsets that are unlike those that perform well in the realm of
incremental innovation.
Building on the radical innovation literature and the case studies of three global firms, three
sets of metrics for radical innovation are proposed: market orientation, learning and future
opportunities and resource dedication.
KPIs for radical innovation projects deviate from the traditional R&D project measures and
should be adapted to fit an uncertain environment. The proposed metrics are targeted for
the front-end, i.e. before the commercialization phase. In the commercialization phase,
commonly used metrics have better usability. Therefore, innovation managers should pay
close attention to the overall portfolio and adopt an appropriate set of measures for different
projects depending on their maturity and type.
The findings are based on the literature and a case study on three firms that have been
actively working with radical innovation for several years. It is not expected that the metrics
presented here are fully exhaustive or provide an immediate “silver bullet” for radical
innovation project success. The benefits of adoption of any type of measure depend on who
is using the measures. Different kinds of managerial biases (e.g. group thinking, pet








Projects that can be used in many different settings are
better than projects that can be launched only for single
products. Allows for other opportunities to branch out,






Managers of radical innovation projects should consider
how feasibility and experimentation studies are carried
out and what resources the studies require. Enables
firms to understand the best way in which resources are








Does the opportunity give an opening for growth or
synergy in an existing business segment? Studies have
previously indicated that “product and service bundling”








This reflects on discontinued projects. Provides a
precise description of why the project was shut down.
Also explains the parameters that were fulfilled as part of
the project, whom to contact, and under what conditions






Is the project related to the core business activities? Is
the firm able to benefit from core competencies and
resources? Where are the synergies located? Enables
increased legitimacy for projects and may increase the
likelihood of embedding the radical innovation project in
the core of the firm in the future
Source: Based on literature review and the case studies in this paper
































projects and confirmation bias) can hamper the potentially useful information available.
Nevertheless, the study does discuss immediate and pertaining issues with using
established metrics for radical innovation. The study provides useful metrics that can be
part of a more holistic and effective assessment of radical innovation projects.
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Gives an overview of projects supported as a part of the
current pipeline ($ spent, $ on budget) with a headcount
indication per project (i.e. conversion of full-time employee
per project). Gives management an indication of how









Does the firm have an “in-house” market and technology
know-how to fulfill the task? Does the firm’s knowledge base






Does the firm possess, and is it able and willing to allocate,
adequate financial resources and equipment for the project?
(Before any serious commitment is made to the projects, the
firm has to decide whether it is willing to dedicate substantial







Do we have an accessible ecosystem of upstream and
downstream complementors and partners, as well as the
institutional support to pursue the project? Under which
premises can we dedicate external partners for the project,
and what are our requirements for the partners? External
partners are often crucial for radical innovation project
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the project should be stated early on
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